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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
LEROY R. CLARK, et al, 
Plaintiffs and AppelZants, 
vs. 
JAMES T. EREKSON, et al 
Defendants and Respondents. 
Case No. 9005 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS, 
CLYDE R. 'THOMPSON and MRS. CLYDE R. 
THOMPSON 
STATEMEN'T OF FACTS 
This case arises as a result of a dispute as to 
the width of a lane known as Erekson's lane which 
is located in Salt Lake County as an extension of 
7th East, running southerly from Vine Street east 
of Murray, Utah. 'The evidence shows that a lane 
has been open through the area for over 50 years 
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and now a dispute has arisen as to the proper width 
thereof. After taking testimony, the court concluded 
that a public road existed and that the reasonable 
width of said lane between the properties of the 
parties should be 40 ft. in part and 50 ft. the bal-
ance of the distance, he having concluded that "such 
width is reasonalJly necessary as a public road." 
The undisputed facts show that for more than 
30 years last past the maximum width of said lane 
in front of appellant's property has been 24.6 ft. 
'This width has been established by the east fence 
line of the defendants' <land and the west fence, 
tree and garage line of the plaintiffs' land. 
The witnesses may be classified into the follow-
ing groups as to their testimony relating to the 
use of the lane over the past years: 
1. Members of the South Cottonwood Ward 
and Grant Ward traversed the lane on foot, on 
horseback or in buggies in going to and from church. 
(R. p. -04, 11. 25-30; R. p. 105, 11. 1-30; R. p. 106, 
11. 27-28; R. p. 127, 11 9-12; R. p. 133, 11. 15-30; 
R. p. 149, 11. 1-13; R. p. 175, 11. 22-30; R. p. 176, 
11. 1-22; R. p. 194, 11. 12-15; R. p. 195, 11. 1-14). 
2. Business customers or business associates 
of the Erekson dairy farm used the lane in deliver-
ing feed or to purchase milk and other dairy pro-
ducts (R. p. 104, 11. 20-25; R. p. 106, 11. 19-24; 
R. p. 127, 11. 13-19; R. p. 140, 11. 4-11). 
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3. Fisherman occasiona'lly used the lane while 
fishing in the creek (R. p. 84, 11. 13-24; R. p. 149, 
11. 14-19). 
4. On rare occasions other persons used the 
lane for other purposes ( R. pp. 82-83; R. p. 163, 11. 
8-30; R. p. 169, 11. 1-24). Respondent Crabtree 
testified that the "public" used the lane ( R. p. 106, 
11. 6-7). However, an examination of his testimony 
at pages 104 to 106 discloses that the "public" to 
him meant 'the church members, the fishermen and 
Erekson's customers and business associates. 'That 
counsel for the respondents was aware of this ap-
parent defect in proof is demonstrated by his un-
successful attempts to show that the lane was used 
by the customers of a store located north of subject 
property (R. p.135, 11.12-30; R. p.164, 11. 6-11). 
Six restrictive factors are undisputed in the 
record as to the width of use of the lane. 
A. 19 to 22 feet long culvert across the lane 
immediately north of plaintiff's property has re-
stricted the use to such 19 to 22 feet width as long 
as anyone can remember; 
B. The Rauscher Pond within the limits of 
the plaintiff's property which extended westerly to 
the point of the Hne of the plaintiff's trees and fence 
which restricted the use of the lane to 24.6 feet up 
until about 1925; 
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C. Approximately 30 years ago the west por-
tion of the Rauscher Pond was filled and within four 
or five years thereafter the trees were planted and 
the fence erected along its present line and the 
existence of the trees, fence and garage along the 
west side of plaintiff's property has restricted the 
use of the lane to 24.6 feet for the past 30 years; 
D. At the crossing of the Cottonwood stream 
to the south of plaintiff's property the old Cedar 
Post and tree show that the maximum width there 
was approximately 22 feet; 
E. To the south of the stream in an extension 
of the lane the defendants, Erekson, have maintained 
two ponds which are 16 feet apart between which 
the lane passes and hence have restricted the width 
and use of the lane to 16 feet. 
F. The defendant, Erekson, has maintained 
gates approximately 15 feet in width across the lane 
a:t its south termini, which perforce, have restricted 
the use of the lane to such width. 
This lane is a meandering country alley and 
the character of the lane is shown by the photo-
graphs Exhibits 1, to 9 inclusive. Attached hereto 
as an Appendix are two illustrative plats of the 
area showing the restricted nature and use of the 
lane and superimposed thereon the effect of the 
decree by the Court in widening the same beyond 
its former use and purpose. 
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There is an ancillary factual issue in the pro-
ceeding as to the description of the Appellants' 
property, in that the court found that a boundary 
by acquiescence was established at a point 244.90 
feet east of the present quarter corner monument, 
whereas the decree quieting title does not exactly 
fdllow said line. The finding by the Court is that 
the Appellants' trees, fence and garage have been 
there at the said line for over 30 years. The con-
clusion is that a boundary by acquiescence has been 
thus established, but the Decree failed to follow 
said line. This inadvertance should now be rectified. 
STATEMENT OF POIN·TS 
POINT I. 
THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING AND CON-
CLUDING THAT 'THE WIDTH OF EREKSON'S LANE 
IS A PUBLIC ROAD AND SHOULD BE 40 FEET WIDE 
IN PART AND 50 FEET IN PART, AS SUCH FIND-
ING IS CONTRARY TO THE EVIDENCE AND THE 
LAW. 
POINT II. 
THE COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING 'THAT 
THE USE OF THE LANE HAS BEEN RESTRICTED 
BY THE CULVERTS, THE TREES, 'THE PONDS AND 
THE GATES, AND HAS NOT EXCEEDED 25 FEET IN 
\VIDTH AT ANY TIME. 
POINT III. 
THE COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW 
IN CONCLUDING THAT ONCE IT HAS FOUND A 
PUBLIC RIGHT OF WAY TO EXIST ALONG THE 
ESTABLISHED LINE OF THE LANE THAT IT MAY 
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BY DECREE WIDEN THE SAME TO SUCH WIDTH 
AS 'THE COUR'T DEEMS NOW REASONABLY NECES-
SARY FOR ITS USE AS A PUBLI'C ROAD IN LIGHT 
OF PRESENT VEHICULAR TRAVEL. 
POINT IV. 
THE COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT 
THE ·TITLE TO THE PLAINTIFF'S PROPERTY 
SHOULD BE QUIE'TED ALONG 'THE LINE OF THE 
BOUNDARY LINE AS SHOWN BY THE TREES, GAR-
AGE, AND FENCE BEING 244.90 FEET EAST OF THE 
PRESENT QUARTER CORNER MONUMENT (OR 
204.90 FEET EAST OF THE OLD MONUMENT) AS 
REFLECTED BY THE CONCLUSIONS OF LAW. 
AR'GUMEN'T 
POINT I. 
THE COURT E'RRED IN FINDING AND CON-
CLUDING THAT THE WIDTH OF EREKSON'S LANE 
IS A PUBLIC ROAD AND SHOULD BE 40 FEET WIDE 
IN PART AND 50 FEET IN PART, AS SUCH FIND-
ING IS CON'TRARY TO THE EVI'DENCE AND THE 
LAW. 
The decree of the trial court adjudges that a 
north-south public road (called Erekson Lane) ex-
tends along the west 'boundary of the property de-
scribed in paragraph 1. a. of the decree (herein-
after called "subject property") and that said lane 
is fifty feet in width a:t certain points and forty 
feet in width a:t certain points as it passes subject 
property. A portion of this iane is shown in Exhibits 
1 to 5, 8 and 9 in relation to subject property. Ex-
hibits 2, 3, 4 and 8 are pictures taken from the 
north looking south 'and show a row of trees in line 
6 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
with the side of a garage abutting the east side 
of the lane. Exhibits 1, 5 and 9 are pictures taken 
from the south looking north and show the abutting 
trees and garage from the opposite direction. 
The public road decreed to exist includes not 
only the travelled portion of the lane shown in said 
exhibits but also an untravelled area ranging in 
width from about fifteen to twenty-five feet ex-
tending eas't of and including said row of trees and 
garage. Appellant Clyde R. Thorn pson asserts : A 
The evidence fails to support the finding and de-
cree that Erekson Lane is a public road, and B As-
suming Erekson Lane is a public road, there is no 
evidence to support the finding and decree as to the 
untravelled area. 
A 
The evidence fails to support the finding and 
decree that Erekson Lane is a public road. The Utah 
statute governing the dedication of public streets 
by use (27-1-2 U.C.A. 1953) provides that "a high-
way shall be deemed dedicated and abandoned to 
the use of the public when it has been continuously 
used as a public thoroughfare for a period of ten 
years." While the record contains substantial evi-
dence that the lane has been and now is being 
regularly used by certain limited classes of persons, 
it does not contain evidence of use by the general 
pub'lic sufficient to constitute the lane a public road. 
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The record shows that the following persons have 
used the lane over the years for the purposes in-
dicated: 
1. Members of the South Cdttonwood Ward 
and Grant Ward traversed the lane on foot, on horse-
back or in buggies in going to and from church; 
2. Business customers or business associates 
of the Erekson dairy farm used 'the lane in deliver-
ing feed or to purchase milk and other dairy pro-
ducts; 
3. Fishermen occasionally used the lane while 
fishing in the creek; 
4. On rare occasions other persons used the 
lane for other purposes. Respondent Crabtree testi-
fied that the "public" used the lane ( R. p. 106, 11. 
6-7). However, an examination of his testimony 
discloses that the "public" to him meant the church 
members, the fishermen and Erekson's customers 
and business associates. That counsel for the res-
pondents was aware of this apparent defect in proof 
is demonstrated by his unsuccessful attempts to show 
that the lane was used by the customers of a store 
'located north of subject property (R. p. 135, 11. 
12-30; R. p. 164, 11. 6-11). 
The use of a road by a few individuals but not 
by the public generally does not create a public 
highway by prescriptive use (Harris v. Schwartz, 
115 N. E. 345). The use of a road by employees, 
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customers and business associates does not consti-
tute it a public highway (Thompson v. Nelson, 273 
P. 2d 720, Utah, 1954). This court in the Thompson 
case quoted with approval the fol'lowing definition 
of what constitutes a thoroughfare: 
"'A "thoroughfare" is a place or way 
through which there is passing or travel. It 
becomes a "public thoroughfare" when the 
public have a general right of passage. Under 
this statute the highway, even 'though it be 
over privately owned ground, will be deemed 
dedicated or abandoned to the public use when 
the public has continuously used it as a thor-
oughfare for a period of ten years, but such 
use must be by the public. Use under private 
right is not sufficient. If the thoroughfare is 
laid out or used as a private way, its use, 
however, long, as a private way, does not 
make it a public way; and the mere fact that 
the public also make use of it, without objec-
tion from the owner of the ;land, will not make 
i't a public way. Before it becomes public in 
character the ovrner of the land must consent 
to the change. Elliott, Roads and Streets, No. 
5.' " 
The record is barren of evidence that the ''pub-
lic" has used Erekson Lane for ten continuous years 
so as to cons'ti tu te it a public road. 'The use of the 
lane by neighboring church friends, employees, cus-
tomers and business associates was obviously per-
missive not hostile, particularly in view of the regu-
lar use at intervals of the gates. The sporadic use 
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of the lane by fishermen in season or the occasional 
use by others is whorly insufficient to support a 
finding and decree of a public road. 
B 
Assuming Erekson Lane is a public road, there 
is no evidence to support the finding and decree as 
to the untravelled area. The uncontradicted evidence 
detailed below is that prior to 1925 to 1930 the so-
called "R'auscher" pond extended west of its present 
location (shown in Exhibits 3 and 8 to approxi-
mately the line of said row of trees. A fence guarded 
the pond on the west at that time. Between 1925 
and 1930, a portion of the pond was filled in and 
its western edge moved eastward fourteen or fifteen 
feet to its approximate present location shown in 
said Exhibits 3 and 8. When the pond was filled 
in the fence was moved east to about the location 
of the fence shown in said Exhibits 3 and 8. Not 
over four or five years after these changes occurred, 
the row of trees was planted abutting the east side 
of the ilane along the approxima:te line of the former 
pond edge and the garage was moved to its present 
location. 
The following testimony and findings corro-
borate the above recitals : 
Joseph Gillam who has lived in the neighbor-
hood since he was a boy (R. p. 133, 11. 4-5) testified 
10 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
that between 1888 and 1910 there were fences but 
no trees on both sides of the lane north of the creek 
(R. p. 137, 11, 1-30). Horace Godfrey used the lane 
from 1890 to 1903 (R. p. 162, 11. 10-18) and testi-
fied there was a fence on the Rauscher's (east) 
side of the lane and that when he took loads of hay 
into the Rauscher's barn during haying he would 
have to "turn with vigor, just within a short dis.-
tance up there, into the barn" ( R. p. 164, 11. 12-
19). Godfrey said there was a pond on the west 
side of the Rauscher place next to the lane; that 
the lane was sixteen to twenty feet wide where it 
crossed the creek (R. p. 166, 11. 11-26); and that 
the culvert 'beneath the lane was the same width 
(R. p. 168, 11. 2-11). Irene Littson Ottley who 
used the lane as far back as 1892 remembered the 
Rauscher pond and could not remember when it was 
constructed. She said there were fences on both 
side of the lane north of the creek between ft and 
Vine Street (R. p. 170, 11. 4-15). Defendant J. T. 
Erekson stated the so-called Rauscher pond at one 
time extended further west than it now does; that 
Shafer filled in a portion of the pond, moving the 
west edge of the pond east and at the same time 
moved the fence east (R. p. 178, 11. 14-24). Brent 
Gaufin remembered .. that 'before the pond was filled 
in, the west edge extended approximately to where 
the row of trees shown on Exh:i!bit P3 now is ( R. 
ll 
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p. 145, 11. 25-30). Gaufin said that between 1925 
and 19'30 the west edge of the pond was moved 
eastward approximately fourteen to fifteen feet (R. 
p. 146, 11. 10-30) and that before this change oc-
curred the lane was approximately twenty-five fee't 
wide between the west edge of the pond (the present 
tree line) and the west side of the lane (R. p. 151, 
11. 9-13). Plaintiff Leroy R. Clark moved to said 
property in August, 1935 (R. p. 77, 11. 12-13) and 
said that at that time there was a fence post at the 
"end of the last tree" in front of the garage ( R. p. 
88, 11. 11-27). Based on this evidence the court 
found: 
''Prior to the planting of the trees and 
erection of the garage, plaintiffs' predeces-
sor in title maintained a pond which pre-
sently exists but which extended Westerly to 
the line described in the preceding paragraph 
un!til it was filled about 30 years ago." (R. 
p. 64) 
Defendant J. T. Erekson testified that the 
garage shown in Exhibits 1, 2, 3 and 4 was placed 
in its present position and the row of trees was 
planted some time between 1925 and 1930 and have 
been in place since ·then ( R. p. 179, 11. 3-30) . Brent 
Gaufin also testified that said trees were planted 
between 1925 and 1930 (R. p. 143, 11. 15-29) and 
that the garage moved to its present location after 
1930 (R. p. 144, 11. 1-5). Based upon that and 
12 
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other testimony, the court found, and properly so, 
that "for more than thirty years last past the plain-
tiffs have had, established and maintained a garage, 
trees, and a fence along the west line of the property 
described in paragraph 2 above" (R. p. 63). 'There 
is no evidence that the pub'lic has made any use 
of the area east of said row of trees since they were 
planted. 
Except for a period of not over four or five 
years the east line of Erekson Lane, as it passes 
subject property, has been marked either by the 
row of trees and the west side of the garage shown 
in said exhibits or by the pond edge which formerly 
extended out to the present tree line and which was 
surrounded by a fence. There is no evidence what-
soever that the un tra veiled area east of said tree 
line has ever been used by the public. It could not 
have been used prior to 1925-1930 because of the 
pond and fence nor afterward because of the trees 
and garage. This un tra veiled area may have been 
used during 'the four or five year period between 
the filling in of the pond and the planting of the 
trees although there is no evidence to prove it. Even 
if it were used during this period, the use was not 
of sufficient duration to establish a public road. 
Since the record is clear and the findings con-
firm the fact that Eerekson Lane where it passes 
the so-caHed Rauscher pond (even assuming the 
13 
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land is a public street) could never have exceeded its 
present width (approximately twenty-five feet) ex-
cept possibly for an interval of four or five years, 
the decree of the court tha:t the lane at tha;t point is 
either forty or fifty feet wide must, as to the un-
travelled portion east of the tree line, be based upon 
something other than actual use. Perhaps the court's 
error arose from a misinterpretation and misappli-
cation of the principle state in Lindsay Land & 
Live Stock Co. v. Churnos, 285 Pac. 646, and Jeremy 
v. Bertagnole, 116 P. 2d 420, that the width of a 
public highway created through ten years of con-
tinuous public use would be that reasonable and 
necessary for the uses which were made of the road 
and 'that the width would not be limited to the area 
actually used. If that is the basis of the court's 
decision as 'to the untraveled area, the court erred 
for the following reasons: 
First: Under 'the facts and circumstances of 
this case a right-of-way the width of the area now 
travelled and used is all that is reasonable and 
necessary for the uses which have been made of the 
lane; and 
Second: 'The above princple is inappiiC'able 
here since the abutting land never actually used by 
the public as a right-of-way is occupied by valual1le 
im provemen'ts. 
14 
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POINT II. 
THE COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT 
THE USE OF THE LANE HAS BEEN RESTRICTED 
BY THE 'CULVERTS, THE TREES, THE PONDS AND 
THE GATES, AND HAS NOT EXCEEDED 25 FEET IN 
WIDTH AT ANY TIME. 
Erekson Lane is an irregularly-shaped, mean-
dering country lane which prior to the advent of 
automobiles was used principally by pedestrians 
and horseback riders and some buggies and wagons. 
The lane is now occasionally used by automobiles 
although such use has been rare because of the lack 
of a vehicular bridge across the creek. About 'the 
only vehicles that now use the lane are those be-
longing to the customers and business associates 
of the Erekson dairy (R. pp. 104-106). During 
fishing season some cars pull into the lane and park 
while the occupants are fishing (R. p. 84, 11. 13-24). 
Very few automobiles use the lane as a means of 
getting from Vine Street to 59th South. Clark testi-
fied 'that during the more than twenty years he 
lived there he occasionally crossed the creek and 
drove to 59th Sou'th from his place but that he sel-
dom saw other cars driving through (R. p. 84, 11. 
3-12). The reason for this is obvious since the pub-
lic would not reasonably be expected to use a narrow 
dirt country lane often closed by gates which crosses 
an open unbridged ditch when there are wide public 
highways available for use nearby (Exhibit 14). 
l!) 
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The lane in its present condition is whol'ly ade-
quate for the uses to which it has been pu't. No one 
has ever complained that it is inadequate. The ve-
hicles that use it come and go without difficulty 
except possibly when they get stuck in 'the ditch and 
that circumHtances of course has no relationship to 
the width of the lane. On the occasions when the 
county has had equipment in the lane it has been 
able 'to maneuver without any reported difficulty. 
The lane in its present condition is wide enough 
for two vehicles to pass (R. p. 123, 11. 14-19). 
'The attention of the court is directed to the 
attached appP-ndix which are illustrative plats. Par-
ticularly there are six restrictive factors which 
obviate any possible 1egitima:te claim of a public 
road over 24.6 feet wide. 
a. 19 to 22 feet long culvert across the lane 
immediately north of plaintiff's property 
which has restricted the use to such 19 to 22 
feet width as long as anyone can remember; 
b. The Rauscher Pond within the limits of 
the plaintiff's property which extended wes-
terly !to the point of the line of the plaintiff's 
trees and fence which restricted the use of 
the lane to 24.6 feet up until about 1925; 
c. Approximately 30 years ago the west por-
tion of the Rauscher Pond was filled and 
within four or five years thereafter the trees 
were planted and the fence erected along its 
present 1line and the existence of the trees, 
fence and garage along the west side of plain-
tiff's property has restricted the use of the 
lane to 24.6 feet for the past 30 years; 
lf' 
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d. At. the crossing of the Cottonwood stream 
to the south of plaintiff's property the old 
Cedar Post and tree show that the maximum 
·width there was approximately 22 feet; 
e. 'To the south of the stream in an extension 
of 'the lane the defendants, Erekson, have 
maintained two ponds w·hich are 16 feet apart 
have restricted 'the width and use of the lane 
to 16 feet. 
f. The defendant, Erekson, has maintained 
gates approximately 15 feet in width across 
the lane at its south termini, which perforce, 
havP- restricted the use of 'the lane to such 
width. 
~These six obstacles are of long standing and 
have utterly prohibited a "public or o'ther use of 
the lane in excess of the 24.6 ft. width." The fence 
line of respondents along the west side of the lane 
has been there for more years than anyone cared 
to state. 'This has fixed the west line apparently 
though the logic of the district court! s decree would 
permit this to 1be moved over as readily as appel-
lants' trees, garage and fence to accommodate the 
width which the 'trial court feels might be more 
desirable for present automotive travel. 
This country lane fords the Cottonwood Creek. 
In 'the winter no one tries to run a car through the 
snow and the creek too. There was no evidence of 
such win'ter travel through the creek. In the spring, 
during the runoff, the lane is impassible because 
of high waters. At the point where the lane enters 
17 
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the Cottonwood Creek heading south, there is an 
old cedar post just 21 feet east from the respondents' 
fence line. Mr. Clark testified as to a special exam-
ination and measurement of the same made during 
the course of the trial. 
It is respectfully suggested there is no valid 
legal basis upon which the court can decree a right-
of-way greater in width than the used and travelled 
area when for the past seventy or eighty years the 
lane as it now exists has adequately served the pur-
poses for which it has been used without difficulty 
or complaint. 
It is dbvious that the defendants are now at-
tempting by means other than appropriate condem-
nation proceedings to expand what is and always 
has been a narrow, quiet, little-used country lane 
into a city street. On cross-examination defendant 
Marlowe L. Cra:btree testified as follows: 
'''Q. That is your property, that is what 
you claim? 
A. Yes, but I don't want it for any pur-
pose other than a road. 
Q. You just want it for a road? 
A. I want to open that road, we all 
want. 
Q. You want to make that road in 
there? 
A. Yes. 
18 
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Q. Now when you make that road, are 
you going to make that middle line, and make 
it half here and half here (indicating), or 
do you want to leave the road as it is now? 
A. From my east fenceline, I want to go 
as far east as the Judge wouild allow us, a:t 
least 50 feet, and if they make it four roads, 
it would be fine." ( R. p. 121, 1. 30; R. p. 122, 
11. 1-12) 
Later Crabtree testified: 
"Q. Is it 50 feet wide along all the way 
it runs? 
A. I haven't measured. 
Q. Well, approximately. You can 'tell 
about what 50 feet is. 
A. We would like to have it. 
Q. Running even across hills, or do you 
want to make it straight? 
A. I don't know. It is other people's-
Straight. I think I would go along just defini-
tely in opening up that lane anywhere you 
want it. 
Q. You want to make it a County road 
through there? 
A. Yes. 
Q. O.K. 50 feet wide, you want to make 
it? 
A. I wouild like four roads." (R. p. 126, 
11. 2-15) 
It is significant that as late as 1953 defendant 
Erekson asserted to plaintiff Clark that Erekson 
19 
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Lane was a private lane and that Clark would have 
no right to use it in reaching a tract which he had 
reserved in conveying to Thompson (R. p. 185, 11. 
26-30; R. p. 186, 11. 1-5; R. p. 189, 11. 17-20; 
R. p. 208, 11. 22-30; R. p. 209, 11. 1-8). Yet for 
reasons best known to Erekson he had at the trial 
changed his position and then asserted that the 
lane was and always had been a public street. 
POINT III. 
THE COURT ERRED AS A 1\/fATTER OF LAW 
IN CONCLUDING THAT ONCE IT HAS FOUND A 
PUBLIC RIGH'T OF WAY TO EXIST ALONG THE 
ESTABLISHED LINE OF THE LANE THAT IT MAY 
BY DECREE WIDEN THE SAME TO SUCH WIDTH 
AS 'THE COURT DEEMS NOW REASONABLY NECES-
SARY FOR rTS USE AS A PUBLIC ROAD IN LIGHT 
OF PRE,SENT VEHICULAR TRAVEL. 
The effect of the court's decision is to enlarge 
the above principle to mean that the width of a road 
created by public use is that vvidth which is reason-
ably necessary for the purposes for which it might 
be used in the future rather than for the purposes 
established by prior public use. That this court did 
not intend such a result is illustrated by the state-
ment in Jer.emy v. Bertagnole that "A bridal path 
abandoned to the public may not be expanded by 
court decree into a boulevard.'' 
B. 
Appellants contend the principle developed in 
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the above cases is inapplicable here not only because 
the travelled area is adequate for the uses to which 
the lane has been put but also because of the differ-
ent circumstances involved. In those cases the as-
serted public road was across open grazing land. 
Here the land is a heavily wooded rural residentiaJl 
and farming area. Except in the one instance noted 
below, the roads there involved do not appear to 
have been bounded by fences. 'There is a fence here. 
In neither of those cases does it appear that there 
were valuable buildings, trees or other improve-
ments owned by the abutting land owner in conflict 
with the decreed public road. Here a valuable garage 
and full-grown shade trees over thirty years old 
conflict with the decreed right-of-way. In both of 
those cases the road was regularly used for the 
trai'ling of sheep or cattle and in using the road 
for this purpose an area greater in width than 'the 
decreed public road was used. The use of Erekson 
Lane has been limited to pedestrian, equestrian and 
some vehicular traffic. Under the circumstances of 
the Lindsay and Jeremy cases the courts' refusal 
to limlt the declared width of the public road to the 
width of the observable use (sixteen feet in the 
Jeremy case) is understandable and has reason. 
However, to enforce the court's decree here will be 
unreasonable and will irreparably damage appel-
lant by requiring the removal of a valualile building 
and the beautiful shade trees which greatly enhance 
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the value of the property and which constitute one 
of the chief attractions causing appellant Thomp-
son to purchase it. If a court has the power to so 
condemn valuable private property without compen-
sation, what, if any, is the limit to such power? Sup-
pose that instead of the trees and garage there had 
been constructed on said land a million dollar struc-
ture used by 'the plaintiff and his predecessors in 
the conduct of a business permitted by local zoning 
ordinances. As is true of the grage and trees, such 
bujilding would have been upon land declared by the 
court to belong to the plaintiff subject to a public 
road although in fact the public has never used the 
property. Yet under the court's view, appellant 
would be required to remove the 'building without 
compensation. Appellant asserts the court has no 
such power under our law except as it may be exer-
cised in proper condemnation proceedings where 
the appellant can be adequately compensated for his 
loss. 
A circumstance in the Jeremy case suggests 
that the princip'le there applied is modified where 
the landowner has improvements on the land abut-
ting the used portion of the road. There the court 
declared the road to be sixty feet in width "for a 
small fenced portion of its length" and "* * * Five 
rods for the remaining portion." If the court in the 
J er.emy case had the power which the trial court in 
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this case assumes to exercise, why wasn't the public 
road decreed to be of uniform width both as to the 
fenced and unfenced portion? Obviously the court 
considered tha:t different principles governed the 
two road segments. Since the existence of fences 
enclosing the narrower segment is the only factor to 
distinguish it from the wider one, it must be assumed 
that the court considered it was, for some reason 
related to the fences, precluded from decreeing a 
larger width as to the fenced portion. Appellant 
submits this reason was that the court recognized it 
lacked authority to condemn the area occupied by 
the fences v1ithout proper proceedings in which the 
abutting land owner could be compensated for his 
loss. To do otherwise would constitute a taking of 
private property without due process of law con-
trary to the provisions of Article I, Section 22 of 
the Utah Constitution which provides: "Private 
property shall not be taken or damaged for public 
use without just compensation." 
In Whitesides v. Green, 44 Pac. 1032 (Uta:h) 
decided April 13, 1896, the evidence was that appel-
lant had on March 25, 1895 constructed a fence 
approximately one-half rod inside the boundary of 
his property and asserted that the highway in ques-
tion was only one rod wide. The Supreme Court af-
firmed the trial court's holding that the road was 
three rods wide and had been established through 
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fifteen years uninterrupted use by the public. The 
effect of that decision would be to require the re-
moval of the fence located on appellant's property. 
However, unlike ·this case, the fence there was lo-
cated after the public road had been created. 
In Burrows v. Guest, 12 Pac. 84 7 (Utah 1887) 
the Utah Supreme Court reversed the trial court's 
holding that the question of whether a public road 
existed should have been submitted to the jury. The 
court by dictum said that the existence of a :formal 
recorded plat of survey showing the width of a road 
would be strong evidence in determining the area 
dedicated for public road purposes and by implica-
tion approved the action of the road supervisor in 
removing shrubs and trees from an area within a 
platted street but off the regularly used portion of 
the street. However, here the officia1l plat does not 
show Erekson Lane and the evidence clearly demon-
strates that the public has never used the untrav-
elled portion of said decreed public road. 
We are not unmindful of the Boyer v. Clark 
decision 326 Pac (2) 107, 7 Ut. (2d) 395 wherein 
the Middle Canyon Road was decreed to be a public 
road. 'Therein the court remanded the case for a 
de termination by the trial court, "the width of the 
highway, which must be determined in accordance 
wi1th what is reasonable and necessary for the uses 
to which the road has been put." The trial court 
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was spared the necessity of making a determination 
in that case because the parties proceeded to stipu-
late as to width. 
However, in our present case, the trial court 
here construed the Boy.er v. Clark case decision to 
require that he fix a width for the Erekson Lane 
to accommodate automotive traffic far in excess 
of any present or past use. It is now proper lhat 
your court clear up this matter and relieve the 
trial courts from their misapprehension that on 
'their shoulders rests the right and responsibility 
to widen a path, a lane or a country road in to a 
modern boulevard. 
POINT IV. 
'THE COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING 'THAT 
THE TITLE TO THE PLAINTIFF'S PROPERTY 
SHOULD BE QUIETED ALONG 'THE LINE OF TH'E 
BOUNDARY LINE AS SHOWN BY THE 'TREE'S, GAR-
AGE, AND FENCE BEING 244.90 FEET EAST OF THE 
PRESENT QUARTER CORNER MONUMENT (OR 
204.90 FEET EAST OF THE OLD MONUMEN'T) .A:S 
REFLECTED BY THE CONCLUSIONS OF LAW. 
The court found that for more than thirty years 
the appellants have had established and n1aintained 
a garage, trees and a fence along the west line of 
subject property and concluded that said line of 
trees, garage and fence established the boundary 
between the property of appellan1ts and respondents 
by use and acquiescence ( R. pp. 63, 65). The respon-
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dents do not question this portion of the court's find-
ings and conclusions. The property described in 
paragraph 1. a. of the decree quieting title in apel-
lant Clyde R. 'Thompson excludes a strip of land 
north of said garage 0.757 rods wide and 14.706 
rods long which lies east of said decreed line separ-
ating plain1tiffs' and defendants' property. It is 
requested, therefor, that the decree be altered to 
conform with the findings of fact and conclusions 
of law hy changing the description in said para-
graph 1. a. to include said omitted strip of land. 
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CONCLUSION 
This case clearly presents two basic legal prin-
ciples: 
(a) Does the occasional permissive use of 
a lane over a restricted width (not over 24.6 
feet) establish a public use and measure the 
extent of the possible easement; or 
(b) May a trial court, after finding a limit-
ed public use of a lane, expand that narrow 
lane into a modern highway by decreeing a 
width "reasonably necessary" for traffic. 
We submit that the court should now refuse 
such unfettered power of taking land without just 
or any compensation. 'The Decree as to the width of 
!the lane should be modified to 24.6 feet and the long 
acquiesced boundary shou1ld be corrected to conform 
with 'the findings and conclusions. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PUGSLEY, HAYES, 
RAMPTON & W A'TKIS'S 
721 Cont"l Bank Bldg. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Appellants, 
Clyde R. Thompson and 
Mrs. Clyde R. 'Thompson 
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